voting

My Prompt : Is there a cryptographic method in such a way that in a group of voting, it is not possible to identify to what candidate each voter has voted but can evaluate the totals received by each candidate? Chat GPT response : Yes, there is a cryptographic concept that facilitates anonymous voting, ensuring that individual votes remain private while allowing for the accurate tallying of votes for each candidate. This concept is known as "homomorphic encryption."   In the context of voting :   1.    Homomorphic Encryption : Using this cryptographic method, each vote is encrypted in such a way that the encrypted votes can be combined to produce an encrypted tally. Once combined, this encrypted tally can be decrypted to reveal the total number of votes for each candidate, but individual votes cannot be decrypted to determine how each person voted. 2.    Mix-nets : This is another approach where encrypted votes are shuffled or "mixed" together in a

The flaw in Preference voting electing an Executive President   The Problem   Laws must be clear and free from ambiguities, yet the Presidential Elections Act (No. 15 of 1981) of Sri Lanka falls short of this standard. This article highlights a significant flaw in the Act concerning the preference voting system used in presidential elections. Under the current law, preferences are disregarded if a candidate secures over 50% of valid votes, a situation that has been common since the Act's implementation. However, the political landscape in Sri Lanka has shifted dramatically in the past three years, exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic and the country's economic downturn. It is now increasingly unlikely for any candidate to achieve such a majority. This brings to light a critical issue: when preferences are counted due to no candidate reaching the 50% threshold, the eventual winner may not represent the majority's mandate. This flaw underscores the need for a thorough review